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Abstract
Speech given at Session 3: Challenge Facing Resource Development. Ms. King focused
on some of the uncertainties, changes, risks, and opportunities from the viewpoint of the private
financial sector, again with regard to energy. She also highlighted some of the uncertainties in the
specific sectors. And there are big differences between electricity and natural gas, on one hand,
and oil, on the other.
A VIEW OF ENERGY FROM THE PRIVATE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
Irene King*
Good morning. I will now focus on some of the uncertain-
ties, changes, risks, and opportunities from the viewpoint of the
private financial sector, again with regard to energy. I will start
with the main conclusions. Some of them agree with the previ-
ous speaker;' and that was not planned.
We do not see supply shortages or sharp or sustained in-
creases in energy prices as the result of the rapid growth in en-
ergy demand. In terms of geology, technology, and also financ-
ing, there is ample energy supply to fuel the projected growth in
demand. Most importantly, experience shows that under free
markets, even unanticipated price increases trigger compensat-
ing supply adjustments that eventually cap and reverse the origi-
nal price increase. Our concern, therefore, is not about supply
adequacy but about the process - about the terms, conditions,
and timing of its availability. This is mainly affected by govern-
ments - by their energy policy, regulatory policy, overall eco-
nomic policy, foreign policy, and, most importantly, by the con-
sistency of these policies.
The first and most important point about energy supply I
would like to make from the viewpoint of financial markets is
that the same forces that are boosting economic growth and en-
ergy demand are also boosting supply. And these forces are to-
day's buzz words: deregulation, decentralization, globalization,
and privatization. In other words, the same forces that are creat-
ing this fantastic growth in demand that we just saw are also cre-
ating an equally fantastic growth in supply. Moreover, most of
the projected supply increase is in the emerging economies
themselves, especially for oil and gas.
I would like to highlight now some of the uncertainties in
the specific sectors. And there are big differences between elec-
tricity and natural gas, on one hand, and oil, on the other.
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I. ELECTRICITY AND GAS
In the electricity area, one of the important trends is that
the incremental demand will be fueled mainly by natural gas.
This has not been such a strong trend in the past or such a
global trend. The reasons for the change are very well-known:
the environmental attractiveness of natural gas, its ample and
growing reserves-which, by the way, have grown faster than nat-
ural gas demand in the past twenty years-and its low overall
cost, if you include not just the cost of the fuel but also the cost
of building the generating capacity.
And the trends for both natural gas and electricity are de-
regulation everywhere; in some countries privatization and re-
structuring as well; and, eventually, the enlargement of the vari-
ous trading areas.
In some cases these changes will result in lower costs for elec-
tricity and at times even gas. As you know, electricity and gas
have transport limitations. They require dedicated and expen-
sive infrastructure to travel. Thus, the markets are regionally
segmented not only among continents and countries, but also
within the same country or the same state, as we know in the
United States.
As deregulation proceeds and the barriers fall, trade will
grow. The result will be fewer regional segmentations and
smaller cost differences among regions. We do not see, of
course, the complete elimination of regional differences and the
creation of one global market in electricity and gas because that
will require travel over oceans, and so far the technology is not
conducive to a lot of travel over the oceans for electricity or gas.
The driving force behind the deregulation, privatization,
and restructuring of electricity and gas is cost. In the industrial
world, the driving force is cost to industrial consumers. Industry
has cut almost all other costs and now is demanding lower elec-
tricity costs, and threatening to move to other regions if it
doesn't get them.
For the emerging economies, cost is also an issue, but in a
different sense. It has to do with securing the necessary financ-
ing to build the new electricity capacity and pay for the gas that
will be used to make the electricity.
The trend towards deregulation in electricity and gas is
clear. The process, though, is not likely to be smooth. There
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will be setbacks, triggered by the following issues: Issues of re-
turn to the investor versus price to the consumer. This issue is
sort of burning in some areas of the United States. It has also
become important in parts of India and China. Issues of price
differences between industrial users and residential consum-
ers-again, a burning issue in the United States. It will get more
attention in the next few years, and soon it is likely to appear in
Europe and some parts of the emerging world. Another issue is
that of regional price differences, as I mentioned, but also within
the same economic unit. That will be the case in the European
Community. A further issue is that of national security, safety,
and pollution related to nuclear and coal-fired power genera-
tion. And, finally, there are issues of employment. As coal-fired
energy is displaced by gas, net employment will fall in the energy
sector since gas requires fewer people to be produced than coal.
There could, therefore, be trouble in some areas about that as
well.
I will now turn to some of the regional trends. In the
United States, the end result of the deregulation of electricity
will be the creation of a national market in the forty-eight states.
Even in this country, which is so committed to the free market,
however, the process will not be smooth. Currently there are at
least forty-eight deregulations taking place in the United States,
a patched landscape that the financial markets sometimes have
trouble understanding or following.
It is likely, moreover, that at some point Congress will step
in and set national standards for certain key aspects of electricity
and gas, such as the stranded costs for nuclear power, or the
excessive market share that is being created in some areas as nat-
ural gas and electric entities merge. The trigger for Congres-
sional intervention could be the huge differences that are likely
to result in the price of electricity between industrial users and
residential users.
I'm not saying that this is our expectation, but it is a risk.
When we look back to the deregulation of natural gas produc-
tion in the United States during the 1980s and to the current
deregulation of cable TV and telecommunications, we are fear-
ful that we could have in electricity a similar situation: policies
that are changing quite often. The bigger risk behind all this, of
course, is that the bases on which investments have already been
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made and new capacity has been built will change as a result of
new regulations or changes in regulations.
In Europe, the deregulation of electricity and gas will be less
complete than in the United States. It will also be less uniform.
There will still remain differences between the north and south
and the west and the east. The process of deregulation in Eu-
rope, however, will be less contentious than in the United States,
because the deregulation will be negotiated centrally, in Brus-
sels. Around the table will be the member governments, the
consumers, and the producers. Whatever comes out in the end
will, therefore, be something that they all agree to begin with.
In the emerging economies, the patterns of deregulation
and privatization of electricity and gas will vary, of course. Some
countries will not be able to obtain all the required financing to
expand capacity, but the cause of this will be credit issues, finan-
cial policy, and overall economic policy, not shortages of energy
supply. In general, we expect resource-poor but growing emerg-
ing economies to move faster towards deregulation and restruc-
turing and to be able to secure financing. Those with ample
energy resources will have no problem anyway. The concern re-
mains about those countries that are in the early stage of devel-
opment, where the finances are not yet strong and where they
don't have efficient markets, or the ability to deregulate or to
attract private investors. In certain regions, there will be in-
creased trade in electricity and gas among emerging economies,
and this is already happening in Latin America and parts of Asia.
One final word of caution about electricity and gas deregu-
lation: the competition among energy and construction compa-
nies and among financial institutions to support and get in-
volved in the process is lowering the cost of many products.
That is good. It is also leading in some cases, however, to hasty
decisions with respect to location and fuel choice, and this is
bad. It could create surprises in the long term.
II. OIL
I have left oil supply last, partly because this is my main area
of expertise, but also because it tends to produce more surprises
than electricity and gas. Oil already has a global, efficient, and
transparent market. The market provides price signals both for
spot and forward transactions.
Oil deregulation and privatization are further along than
1997]
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those of electricity or natural gas. The reasons are well-known.
The oil price shocks of the seventies and early eighties woke up
the oil consumers. The oil price collapses of the mid-eighties
and early nineties woke up the oil producers. Moreover, oil has
no transport difficulties, unlike electricity and natural gas, and
this is supporting and enhancing deregulation and global trad-
ing. What remains in terms of deregulation for oil is the internal
market in some emerging economies, especially for refined
products, rather than crude oil.
The broad underlying trend, the buzz word for oil supply, is
expansion. New areas are opening up for investment and explo-
ration. There is competition among countries to attract foreign
investment in their oil sectors. As we already heard, there is new
technology that has lowered oil production costs and increased
the rate of reserve recovery from around thirty percent to fifty
percent or more in some cases. Most importantly, however, the
oil industry has strong cash flows; in fact, it has excess cash and is
looking for investment opportunities. In some cases, oil compa-
nies are buying back their shares. It is a creditworthy industry
and, as you know, quite big.
From an economic viewpoint, there is ample oil supply to
meet the projected growth in demand of 2% to 2.5% per year, or
about two million barrels a day per year. In fact, in the next
three years, if the major economies move briefly into the cycle of
a recession, we will even have a temporary glut of oil - small,
but a glut nevertheless.
The risks and uncertainties for oil supply have to do, as I
mentioned already, with government policy and the timing of
supply expansion in some areas, because the timing is controlled
by political events.
Also, please keep in mind that the risks for oil are important
in a broader macroeconomic sense. The oil market is global, so
a problem in supply in one area affects oil prices for every con-
sumer everywhere. In addition, since oil is the largest fuel in
energy consumption and has no substitutes in the transport
area, which is its main use, changes in oil prices affect economic
activity in general - that is, GDP - and the financial markets as
well. For example, during the Gulf War, oil prices doubled and
we had a recession in the United States. For the past two win-
ters, U.S. natural gas prices have tripled, but nothing has hap-
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pened to the U.S. economy. Our analysis shows that, in fact, oil
has the best, positive correlation with inflation in terms of long
term trends.
Here is the list of risks and uncertainties for oil supply, start-
ing from the more definable ones and moving to the more
opaque ones. First, environmental policy, otherwise known as
the car. There are no substitute fuels for transport. Yet the car
has been found to be one of the main sources of pollution. So
far, the policy has been emissions control through changes in
fuel quality and car design.
Consumers, although verbally concerned about pollution,
have been unwilling to change their life style or to pay more for
driving. That could change, however, and the key to that is the
United States. We do not see such a change as imminent, but
there is a risk of a change longer term. Moreover, the current
focus on fuel quality and car design has created a variety of stan-
dards among countries and within the same country. The policy
on fuel quality and car design has been unpredictable in its ap-
plication and has created artificial barriers to trade in refined
products. Occasionally, it has created supply curtailments even
though the underlying supply has been more than available.
The second area of uncertainty for oil supply is China,
which has already been discussed in some way. China is a net oil
importer. It is small right now, but its requirements will rise
steadily in the future. What is important is the basic direction of
economic and political development in China. We expect a
gradual rise in oil imports balanced, on one hand, by the need
for oil in order to grow and, on the other, by the fact that sharp
increases in oil imports will create increases in oil prices and in-
flation, and the government does not want that. So far, that has
been the policy, a sort of balancing act. There could, however,
be extremely rapid expansion of the Chinese economy in an un-
expected way, or a sharp slowdown. That will affect not just
China's energy and oil demand, but also global oil prices; and of
course the domestic political situation could change abruptly.
Another factor about China that is less realized is the loca-
tional decisions of the government. So far, most of the eco-
nomic boom is on the coast. If a decision is made to expand
other areas internally, then China's transport requirements -
that means oil demand - will grow more rapidly. It will mean
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much faster global demand growth for oil and higher oil prices
than we are expecting.
The third area of uncertainty is Russia. It has huge energy
resources. It is a net exporter of energy, unlike the United
States and China. We expect gradual expansion of demand and
of supply and, therefore, the ability to maintain the current rate
of oil exports of three million barrels per day and possibly even
raise them a bit. The uncertainties, however, abound, as you
know.
What is going to be the economic policy, the economic
trend? Are we going to have the recent pattern of two steps for-
ward, one backward? Or will there be a sharp move away from
reform? Could the trend become the opposite, that is, a rapid
move towards reform that will boost economic growth and oil
consumption? It is not clear.
The climate for foreign investment in Russia's oil sector re-
mains unclear, to put it mildly. So far, indications are that most
of the investment will be done by the domestic companies, and
that the role of foreigners will be limited, but that could change.
If you had a big expansion in foreign investment in Russia, if the
barriers currently prohibiting its expansion were to fall, we
would have a lot more oil.
Finally, we have to consider Russia's policies with respect to
its neighbors, Central Asia and the Middle East. Russia is already
moving to secure oil supplies in the Middle East, in Iraq specifi-
cally. It also effectively controls the rate of flow of oil from Cen-
tral Asia to the world market. This brings us to the fourth uncer-
tainty, Central Asia. It has huge reserves, the ability to export oil
equal to about three percent of current.global oil demand and
maybe six percent longer term. However, Central Asia is land-
locked. Additionally, to get to the sea, the oil has to travel
through the following places: Russia including Chechnya, Arme-
nia, Georgia, Turkey, Iran, or Afghanistan. So what the foreign
companies are doing - and there are a lot of foreign companies
investing in Central Asia - is to aim at multiple pipelines, sort
of hedging their bets. This is a wise policy, which we believe will
ensure timely availability of Central Asian oil supply. The supply
will be there and the growth will be gradual, but one cannot
deny that there are risks of cutoff, delays, and other surprises
given the political situation in this region.
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Now we move to the risks with the greater opaqueness, one
of which has to do with Iran. Iran has limited potential for a
sharp rise in oil supply, much less, let's say, than Central Asia,
and it needs a lot of investment. It is also a big power in the
region. It can affect political developments to the south in the
countries of the Gulf, and to the north in Central Asia. Most
important, it is the easiest and cheapest route for Central Asian
oil. The United States has an embargo on Iran, however, and is
making sure that no one else will invest in Iran's oil sector and
that Iran's access to external credit remains limited.
What happens in Iran will, therefore, affect global supply in
two ways: directly in terms of in its own production and indi-
rectly in terms of Central Asia oil supply.
Finally, we come to the biggest uncertainty, Iraq. It has
huge potential for increasing oil production; it has the second-
largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia; the country has not been
fully explored; and the costs are very low. There is pent up de-
mand for consumer goods in Iraq, and the country would, there-
fore, export oil in large amounts to buy the goods it needs. We
have a U.N. embargo on Iraqi oil exports, however, and the little
they export now, 700,000 barrels per day, is just to pay for
medicine and food.
It does not appear that the trade embargo will be lifted
while Saddam is in power. The reasons have to do with weapons
control. They are strategic and mainly related to the United
States. They have little to do with oil.
Most important, regardless of what happens to the trade
embargo, I cannot visualize the long-term political outlook for
the country. When I look down the road two to five years, any-
thing is possible. Saddam could be in power or not in power,
the country may be in a civil war or may not be in a civil war. I
cannot even predict what it will look like under various scena-
rios. That kind of uncertainty is not good for financial markets.
In sum, then, the process of globalization and deregulation
is boosting economic growth. The same forces are boosting en-
ergy demand but also energy supply. There is no physical or
economic shortage of energy supply. The risks as outlined are
many but are manmade.
Thank you very much.
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